This paper studies the relation between option-based compensation grants and managerial risk-taking behavior. We examine risk-shifting in stock and asset risk, where the unobservable asset risk is estimated using the volatility restriction method and Moody's KMV algorithm in a Merton (1974) framework. Our empirical results provide support for the hypothesis that managers increase stock risk by increasing both asset risk and leverage. Furthermore, our unique dataset allows us to investigate whether grant date moneyness affects mangers' risk-shifting behavior. Consistent with recent theoretical predictions we find that out-of-the-money option grants cause increased risk-taking, while deep-in-the-money option grants reduce managerial risk-taking.
Introduction
It is well known that conflicts between managers and shareholders are reduced by relating managerial compensation to firm performance (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976) , and Holmström (1979) ). Haugen and Senbet (1981) point out that when the performance-based compensation consists of stocks only, a risk averse manager might pass up risky positive net-present-value projects, which may not necessarily align the interests of the managers with those of the well diversified shareholders. Option-based compensation (OBC) can be the solution to the risk-related incentive problem since a convex compensation scheme mitigates the effect of the manager's risk aversion and provides incentives to increase risk (see also e.g., Amihud and Lev (1981) , Smith and Stulz (1985) , Lambert (1986) , Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) , and May (1995) ).
Several empirical papers examine cross-sectional relations between OBC incentives and firm characteristics. Previous work of Guay (1999) , Cohen et al. (2000) , and Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) show that a firm's stock return volatility is positively related to the convexity of the total compensation scheme. By using vega to measure OBC risk incentives, Guay (1999) and Coles et al. (2006) find that R&D intensity and growth opportunities have a positive association with vega incentives. Both Cohen et al. (2000) and Coles et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence of a positive relation between OBC risk incentives and firm leverage. On the other hand, Graham et al. (2004) find a reduction in corporate taxes and a more conservative debt policy for firms with an extensive use of OBC. Finally, empirical analyzes in the corporate hedging literature show a negative relation between firm hedging and risk-taking incentives (e.g., Smith and Stulz (1985) , Tufano (1996) , and Rogers (2002) ).
Only a few empirical studies investigate whether firm risk increases after the adoption of an OBC plan. By using data of companies listed at the New York Stock Exchange from 1978 to 1982 , DeFusco et al. (1990 find an increase in the firm's stock return variance following the announcement of a change in the OBC plan. On the basis of U. K. data from 1984 to 1995 , Brookfield and Ormrod (2000 show that single granting firms exhibit greater stock return variance after OBC grants. This paper complements the empirical research by DeFusco et al. (1990) and Brookfield and Ormrod (2000) and examines several other issues not considered in their study. First, the existing literature has primarily focused on the relation between option risk incentives and stock risk. This is indeed also the first effect to analyze since the option value is increasing in stock risk. With this in mind, the next obvious step is to examine whether managers increase stock risk by increasing leverage and/or asset risk. The leverage effect on future stock risk has already been widely addressed in previous work of Lewellen (2006) , Coles et al. (2006) , and others, while Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) is to our knowledge the only paper studying risk incentives' impact on future exploration risk. The reason for the almost non-existing work in this area is mainly because of difficulties in finding a valid procedure to estimate the asset risk. One approach in estimating the unobservable asset risk is to use the Merton (1974) model, where the market value of equity is a residual claim on the value of the firm's assets after all debt obligations are met. When estimating the variance of the firm's assets, we implement two empirical approaches, the volatility restriction method used by Ronn and Verma (1986) , Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) , and Ericsson and Reneby (2005) and Moody's KMV method used by Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) .
We use a hand collected dataset on Danish OBC contracts to test for risk-shifting following option grants. Consistent with DeFusco et al. (1990) and Brookfield and Ormrod (2000) , we find a positive and highly significant change in the stock risk. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence that managers increase stock risk by increasing asset risk, suggesting that options indeed encourage managers to increase the risk in future investments. The positive effect from changes in asset risk on changes in stock risk still remains after controlling for changes in leverage, indicating that managers increase stock risk by increasing both asset risk and leverage.
Recent analytical studies show that risk-taking incentives are highly sensitive to the manager's ability to influence firm risk, the manager's risk aversion and the characteristics of the compensation scheme (e.g., Lambert et al. (1991) , Carpenter (2000) , Feltham and Wu (2001) , Ross (2004) , Nohel and Todd (2004) , and Parrino et al. (2005) ).
1 Related to these theoretical studies, we define a certainty-equivalent risk incentive measure for the risk-averse and undiversified manager in a utility-based model. Analyzing our new measure across the option's moneyness leads to the following prediction that in-themoney option grants reduce risk-taking, while out-of-the-money option grants encourage excessive risk-taking.
Neither DeFusco et al. (1990) nor Brookfield and Ormrod (2000) examine the moneyness' impact on future managerial risk-taking. DeFusco et al. (1990) focus on at-the-money OBC grants, since the U.S. tax authorities punish inthe-money grants. Besides, U.S. firms rarely grant out-of-the-money options. (2004) discusses why broad-based stock option plans exist when the employees' actions have no impact on stock value. Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) find that the manager's responsibility affects the OBC incentives. Lewellen (2006) analyzes leverage choice and risk incentives. Johnson and Tian (2000a) , Johnson and Tian (2000b) , Ingersoll (2002) , Ju et al. (2002) , Jørgensen (2002) , Tian (2004), and Brisley (2006) all investigate risk incentives of nontraditional compensation schemes.
2 Aboody et al. (2004) find that almost all U.S. firms apply the APB No. 25 tax rule by setting the exercise price of the OBC award equal to the stock price at the grant date. In this way, the firms need to disclose only a pro forma net income with a fair value of the OBC scheme at the measurement date under SFAS No. 123. More information about U.S. accounting rules are found via the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) home page, www.fasb.org. (2000) do not provide the price-to-strike ratios of the options at the grant date.
Brookfield and Ormrod
3 Our unique sample does, however, allow for an empirical analysis of managerial risk-shifting across grant date price-to-strike ratios. To our knowledge, this paper is the first empirical work to analyze how exercise price decisions may affect managerial risk-taking behavior.
In order to capture the expected concave relation between moneyness and risk-shifting in stock risk, we follow Huddart and Lang (1996) and include moneyness and moneyness-squared in our regression analysis. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the partial effect from moneyness and moneynesssquared on changes in stock risk increases in moneyness until in-the-money option grants, whereas the partial effect is decreasing for deep-in-the-money option grants. This is partly inconsistent with our hypothesis since we expected that the partial effect would start decreasing at a much lower moneyness level. One possible explanation for our somewhat surprising empirical results could be that the average Danish executive's option component of the entire compensation package is three times smaller than the average option component in the U.S. (see e.g., Bechmann and Jørgensen (2004) , and Jensen and Murphy (2004) ). This makes Danish managers less undiversified and exposed to much lower downside risk, which all may have a positive impact on future managerial risk-taking.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the relation between OBC and managerial risk-taking incentives. Section 3 describes the sample, presents two estimation methods to compute the unobservable asset variance and provides summary statistics of key variables. Section 4 reports the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
Managerial risk-taking incentives
Consistent with empirical studies by Smith and Stulz (1985) and others, the objective of this paper is to investigate whether OBC grants mitigate the effect of the manager's risk aversion and encourage greater managerial risktaking. In order to show how OBC induces risk-taking, we define two measures of OBC risk incentives. First, we present the general approach to measurement of the OBC risk incentives following the definition by Guay (1999 Garvey and Mawani (2005) , and Rogers (2005) all use the definition by Guay (1999) to measure we measure the risk incentives for a risk averse manager in an expected utilitybased framework introduced by Lambert et al. (1991) .
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Guay (1999) use the Black and Scholes (1973) (BS) model to measure the OBC risk incentives,
where v BS is the BS option value sensitivity to a 1% increase in the underlying annualized stock return volatility σ, n is the number of options granted, P is the underlying grant date stock price, N (·) is the normal density function,
X is the strike price with the time-tomaturity in years T and r is the continuous risk-free interest rate. Lambert et al. (1991) point out that the assumptions underlying the BS model do not necessarily apply to the characteristics associated with OBC. When a risk averse and undiversified manager is granted stock options, he is often prohibited from trading or hedging of his stock options to eliminate the firm specific risk. This will influence the OBC value from the perspective of the manager, meaning that the managerial risk-taking incentives are no longer straightforward and might even under some circumstances provide the incentives to decrease firm risk.
Consistent with the existing literature we analyze the risk incentives of stock options in an expected utility framework (see e.g., Lambert et al. (1991 ), Carpenter (2000 , Hall and Murphy (2002) , and Lewellen (2006) ). The value of the OBC grant from a manager's perspective is estimated as the certaintyequivalent value, CE, of the total option grant, which makes the manager indifferent between holding stock options or receiving riskless cash. The manager is assumed to have non-firm-related W ealth and a cash payment of Salary, which both are invested at the continuous risk-free interest rate r until time T . The manager is granted n one-to-one nontradable European stock options with exercise price, X, and time-to-maturity T . Under these assumptions, the manager's total wealth, W ealth T , with options at time T can be written as,
where P T is the stock price at the maturity date.
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On the other hand, if the manager is compensated with the certaintyequivalent in cash rather than OBC, the manager's total wealth at time T is the managerial risk-taking incentives. 5 Carpenter (2000), Hall and Murphy (2002) , Ju et al. (2002) , Lewellen (2006) , Johnson and Tian (2004) , Nohel and Todd (2004) , and Parrino et al. (2005) all use the utility-based framework to value OBC. 6 Using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) the nondividend paying stock price P is lognormally distributed, ln (P T /P 0 ) ∼ N r + β (r m − r) − σ 2 /2 T, σ 2 T and is assumed to follow the geometric Brownian motion process dP = αP dt + σP dW P with an instantaneous drift α, an instantaneous stock volatility σ and a standard Brownian motion W P .
given by:
where CE is assumed to be invested at the continuous risk-free interest rate. The certainty-equivalent approach is applied and the riskless amount of cash, CE, is found numerically when the manager is indifferent between receiving CE and holding n stock options,
where f z (z) is the standard normal probability density function.
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The manager is assumed to be a utility maximizer and has a constant relative risk-aversion utility function U (W T ) =
, where W T is the manager's total wealth at time T and ρ is the manager's risk-aversion coefficient.
To evaluate the managerial risk incentives from holding OBC in an expected utility framework, we numerically solve for the certainty-equivalent value sensitivity to a 1% increase in the underlying annualized stock return volatility,
where v CE is the OBC risk incentives for holding n options and ε = 0.0001. In this paper, it is assumed that managers hold options until expiration date. However, it is worth mentioning that in practice most options are exercisable after a prespecified vesting period. Previous empirical studies find that option holders have a suboptimal exercise behavior, which will affect the OBC risk incentives (see e.g., Huddart and Lang (1996) , Carpenter (1998), and Bettis et al. (2005) ).
In the rest of this section, we illustrate the OBC risk incentives using both the Black-Scholes model and the certainty-equivalent approach, where the illustration will be used to motivate the hypothesis for later empirical testing. Unless otherwise noted, we determine the OBC risk incentives using base-case parameters consistent with the median firm in our sample, where all monetary values are reported in U.S. dollars.
8 To determine the median salary and option grant per executive we use the results in Bechmann and Jørgensen 7 Hall and Murphy (2002) write the certainty-equivalent approach as
, and the change of variables formula is applied, we can convert the infinite integral in P T into an equivalent one with the standard normal random variable z, where z = g (P T ) is a smooth differentiable mapping with a one-to-one relation, hence P T = g −1 (z). The rewriting is found in Appendix A. 8 The present exchange rate (9 May, 2007 ) is 100 DKK = 17.68 USD = 13.20 EUR.
(2004), which is based on the same sample as the empirical analysis in this paper. We assume that the manager has a fixed salary of $391,082 and is granted 14,330 stock options, which is equivalent to a BS value of $67,184. Furthermore, the option is granted at-the-money and has a time-to-maturity of 5 years. Following Hall and Murphy (2002) and Lewellen (2006) we assume that the continuously compounded logreturns are determined by CAPM, where the stock price is $17.68, the median risk-free interest rate is 4%, the median equity risk-premium, r m −r, is 3%, the median stock return volatility is 20%, and beta is 0.65. We use information from Statistics Denmark to find the median non-firm-related manager wealth of $583,440. Finally, we follow the existing literature and use a relative risk-aversion level of 2 (see e.g., Hall and Murphy (2002) , Lewellen (2006) , Bettis et al. (2005) , and Parrino et al. (2005)) [Insert Figure 1 ] Figure 1 illustrates how the option value sensitivity to a 1% increase in the stock return volatility varies across a range of price-to-strike ratios. A large part of the literature has used the definition by Guay (1999) to measure the managerial risk incentives from OBC and find empirical evidence of a positive association between managerial risk incentives and stock return volatility (see e.g., DeFusco et al. (1990) , Brookfield and Ormrod (2000) , Cohen et al. (2000) , Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) , and Coles et al. (2006)). Consistent with prior work, Figure 1 shows that the BS risk incentives are positive across the range of price-to-strike ratios, which naturally leads to the following hypothesis, H 1 : Option grants will increase managerial risk-taking.
There exists, however, theoretical work questioning whether the BS model is the correct model to use when examining the manager's incentives to take risk. Lambert et al. (1991) and Carpenter (2000) point out, that it is not necessarily obvious that options granted to a risk-averse manager will encourage greater risk-taking. Ross (2004) shows that the risk-averse manager's utility function affects the risk-taking behavior. Figure 1 presents the certainty-equivalent value sensitivity to volatility across a range of price-to-strike ratios. First, we find the BS value of the 14,330 granted options for every strike price and adjust the salary to keep the total compensation value constant. In addition, comparing descriptive statistics on OBC in Denmark and U.S. we find that the manager's average option component of the total compensation scheme is three times smaller in Denmark than in U.S., which obviously has an impact on the risk-averse manager's incentives (see e.g., Bechmann and Jørgensen (2004) , and Jensen and Murphy (2004) ). In order to compare the base-case CE risk incentives with the CE risk incentives of a manager holding three times more options than our median Danish manager, we reduce the salary to $256,714 and scale the base-case option component by three, which is equivalent to 42,990 number of options with a BS value of $201,552. Again, we find the BS value for every strike price and adjust the salary to keep the total compensation value constant.
Consistent with the existing work, Figure 1 shows that managers have excessive risk-taking incentives for out-of-the-money grants, whereas managers have incentives to decrease risk-taking for in-the-money option grants (see e.g., Lambert et al. (1991) , Ju et al. (2002) , Lewellen (2006) , Nohel and Todd (2004) , and Parrino et al. (2005) ). When distinguishing between managers holding 14,330 and 42,990 number of options, we find that as the option component of the total compensation package increases the CE risk incentives decreases, suggesting that the managers become more undiversified and less willing to take future risky investments. Furthermore, Figure 1 also indicates that in-the-money option grants increases the manager's downside risk, which is consistent with the conjectures given by Brisley (2006), who predicts a decrease in managerial risk-taking if options move deep in-the-money and thereby lose their convexity.
In sum, Figure 1 indicates that the CE risk incentives vary across the price-to-strike ratios and this leads to the following hypothesis;
H 2 : Risk-shifting varies across price-to-strike ratios:
In-the-money grants will reduce risk-taking and out-of-the-money grants will encourage risk-taking.
Sample collection, variable measurement, and descriptive statistics
In this section, we describe the sample collection and provide descriptive statistics on the option-based compensation dataset. Furthermore, we define two procedures to estimate the unobservable asset risk and present the key variables and summary statistics.
The sample
The data on Danish OBC contracts are based on a hand collected dataset by Bechmann and Jørgensen (2004) , which contains all publicly available information about the characteristics of options granted by Danish listed companies traded at the Copenhagen Stock Exchange (CSE) from 1995 to the mid 2003. In this paper the period is extended to December, 2004. Under the Danish Securities Trading Act and Rules Governing Securities Listing on the CSE, all firms are required to immediately disclose details of the granted OBC scheme, including the grant date. This means that we would expect to find the grant date of the OBC scheme in an immediate announcement and in the annual report.
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Unfortunately, Bechmann and Jørgensen (2004) find that very few firms follow the Rules of CSE and thereby fail to disclose vital characteristics of the compensation scheme. In this study the grant date is a crucial factor and therefore we first systematically searched through all company announcements and second we went through all financial reports and articles of association.
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After going through the first two steps for each firm, we still missed grant dates for 39 firms in the sample. As the final effort in order to obtain the grant dates, we mailed the firms' departments of Investor Relations and received 28 answers of which 19 were positive.
Our initial sample consists of 109 firms with 616 grants between December, 1996 and December, 2004. We deleted 20 firms as a result of grants with an unspecified grant date. Firms in the banking and insurance industry are excluded from the sample since these industries are generally considered tightly regulated which limit their risk-taking. This criteria results in a sample of 84 firms with 509 grants. In order to estimate the stock and asset volatility prior to and after the option grant, the firm has to be listed at the CSE 125 days before and 250 days after the grant date. This criteria excludes 2 firms. Many stocks listed at the CSE are traded infrequently, and firms with a low trading frequency obviously result in a less accurate estimate of stock and asset volatility. We therefore require the firm to be traded at least 1/3 of the estimation period, resulting in exclusion of 5 firms.
For each firm in the sample we use annual financial data from the Account database for year 1996 to 2003, and for the financial year 2004 we hand collect the financial data from the annual reports.
11 Datastream data are used to generate measures of stock-return volatility, market-return volatility and market value of equity. As risk-free interest rate we use the one-year Copenhagen Inter-Bank Offered Rates (CIBOR) compiled from the Danish Central Bank.
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The final sample consists of 77 firms with 379 grants on 257 firm specific grant dates between December, 1996 and May, 2004 .
Summary statistics on option-based compensation
[Insert Table 1] 9 The Danish Disclosure Rules are found via the CSE home page, www.cse.dk. 10 All stock exchange announcements are extracted from the StockWise database, which can be found via the CSE home page, www.cse.dk. 11 The Account database contains annual reports on Danish listed companies traded at the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. 12 The one-year Copenhagen Inter-Bank Offered Rates (CIBOR) can be obtained from the Danish Central Bank via the home page, www.nationalbanken.dk. Table 1 presents statistics on the number of option grants per year and shows that the use of options has increased during the sample period with a peak of 86 grants in 2001. Panel A also shows that between 1996 and 1998 all options in each grant had the same characteristics, whereas from 1999 firms have started to issue options with different characteristics, which is consistent with the empirical findings by Bechmann and Jørgensen (2004) . On the basis of Danish data from 1995 to 2003, Bechmann and Jørgensen (2004) show that only managers were granted options in the early 1990s. From the late 1990s firms started to include directors and employees in the OBC schemes. This complicates matters, since the option characteristics of each grant likely differ among the recipient groups (directors, managers and employees), which implies that each grant consists of several sub-grants with specific option characteristics. For example, in 2001 the 86 option grants were distributed among 62 firm specific grant dates, which clearly emphasizes the complexity of the outstanding OBC schemes.
Panel B of Table 1 provides the statistics on the number of option grants per month and shows that more than 50% of the OBC schemes are issued in January, February, March or December. This is also the period where most Danish companies announce their financial reports suggesting that most options are granted around the announcement date or in association with the annual general meeting.
[Insert Table 2] The Danish Rules at CSE require the firms to disclose the distribution of the option grants to directors, management, middle-management and other employees. However, Bechmann and Jørgensen (2004) find that firms tend to omit vital information about the distribution between middle-managers and other employees. Table 2 follows the classification criteria by Bechmann and Jørgensen (2004) and defines three recipient groups: board of directors, management and employees, where employees consists of both middle-managers and other employees. Table 2 reports the per grant aggregated statistics in the distribution on number of options, option values, risk incentives and option characteristics to the board of directors, the management, and all employees. We use the BS model to calculate the option values and we define the risk incentives as the option value sensitivity for a 1% change in the underlying annualized stock return volatility. All monetary values are reported in U.S. dollars to make our statistics comparable to related U.S. studies.
13 For the management the mean (median) option value is $532,558 ($73,809), and mean (median) vega is $8,969 ($1,331) . Comparing the use of OBC between Danish and U.S. companies, we immediately see that (1) the option component of the total remuneration scheme is much larger for S&P 500 executives compared to Danish executives, and (2) the average total pay level for S&P 500 executives are significantly greater than observed among Danish executives. The higher average pay levels and greater risk incentives from OBC for S&P 500 executives are likely to influence our later empirical results that are based on managerial risk incentives of OBC in Danish companies (see e.g., Guay (1999) , Knopf et al. (2002) , Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) , Bechmann and Jørgensen (2004) , Jensen and Murphy (2004) , and Coles et al. (2006)).
The mean and median price-to-strike ratio is 0.98, which is similar to findings in U.K. and U.S. studies (see e.g., Murphy (1999) , and Stathopoulos et al. (2004)). However, differently from the U.S. we observe a minimum and maximum price-to-strike ratio of 0.16 and 8.86, respectively. Furthermore, unreported summary statistics of the 1st, 5th, 95th, and 99th percentiles are 0.38, 0.58, 1.15, and 1.28, respectively. The substantial variation in grant date price-to-strike ratios are not only observed in Denmark. On the basis of U.K. data from January 1996 to January 1999, Stathopoulos et al. (2004) report that the moneyness of the 1st, 5th, 95th, and 99th percentiles are 0.66, 0.71, 19.5, and 37.5, respectively. In U.S., on the other hand, we mainly find at-themoney option grants due to tax reasons and accounting rules. The observed moneyness in U.S. option grants may very well change since U.S. companies are currently being investigated for deliberately moving their stock option grants back in time to a period with lower stock prices. The practice is called backdating and several CEOs in large U.S. companies are facing civil or criminal fraud charges and have been forced to resign. If U.S. companies will be forced to reset their option grant dates, it is likely that we will observe more variation in grant date moneyness allowing for future research on the relation between moneyness and managerial risk incentives.
The average time-to-maturity of an option grant is 5.23 years, while the median time-to-maturity is 5 years. This contrasts sharply to the practice in the U.S. with a typically maturity of 10 years, whereas the maturity of U.K. option grants range between 7 and 10 years (e.g., Jensen and Murphy (2004) ). This may result in more risky and short-term financing and investment decisions by Danish executives.
Table 2 also shows that there is considerable variation in the distribution of option grants to the three recipient groups. The median option grant to the management and employees are very similar in size, value and risk incentive. On the other hand, the directors are awarded a much lower proportion of the total option grant, which is inconsistent with the analysis by Bechmann and Jørgensen (2004) , who find a steep increase in the proportion of firms that grant options to directors from 1996 to 2001. The Nørby Committee's report on Corporate Governance from December 2001 is a plausible explanation for the decline in option grants to directors after 2001, since the report recommends that OBC should no longer be part of the directors' compensation schemes. 14 14 More information on "The Nørby Committee's report on Corporate Governance -recommendations for good corporate governance in Denmark" is found via the
Firm risk
As mentioned above, it is generally assumed that OBC value is increasing in the underlying stock return volatility. Hence, we expect that OBC will encourage greater managerial risk-taking. So far, the empirical studies have primarily focused on whether OBC risk incentives explain future changes in stock risk (see e.g., DeFusco et al. (1990) , Guay (1999) , Cohen et al. (2000) , Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) , Lewellen (2006) , and Coles et al. (2006)).
When examining the impact from OBC risk incentives on firm risk, it is also interesting to fully understand how managers change stock risk in order to increase the option value. Changes in stock return volatility may come from asset risk changes but also from leverage changes that leave asset risk unchanged. To a great extent, previous studies have focused on the effect from leverage and ignored the effect from asset risk. The paper by Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) is, however, an exception. Based on a sample of oil and gas firms, they examine whether executive stock options provide incentives to take future risky projects. They use the variation of future cash flows from exploration activity as a proxy for asset risk and find a positive relation between option risk incentives and asset risk.
In this paper the volatility restriction (VR) method and Moody's KMV method will be used to estimate the unobservable asset risk, σ V , allowing us to study risk-shifting in stock risk and examine whether these changes may come from changes in asset risk. Both methods are based on the contingent-claim approach by Merton (1974) , where the market value of equity is viewed as a residual claim on the value of the firm's assets after all debt obligations are met.
15 We think this paper is the first to investigate changes in asset risk in a broader cross-section of firms and industries.
When implementing the structural model by Merton (1974) , we follow the existing literature and define the face value of debt, D, as the short-term debt plus half the long-term debt, and the maturity of D is assumed to be one year (e.g., Crouhy et al. (2000) , Crosbie and Bohn (2003) , and Vassalou and Xing (2004) ). The daily market values of equity, E, are computed as the number of home page, www.corporategovernance.dk 15 The Merton (1974) model assumes no corporate taxes or bankruptcy costs and default can only occur if the firm is unable to pay back the debt at the date of expiry T . The Merton (1974) model has, however, been extended in several ways to weaken some of the restrictive assumptions made in the original model by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) . Black and Cox (1976) allow for default before debt maturity by introducing a constant lower boundary, and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) model a more complex debt structure. Tax advantages of debt and bankruptcy costs were introduced by Leland (1994) and refined in Leland and Toft (1996) . A more detailed description of the Merton (1974) model is given in Appendix B.
shares outstanding multiplied by the closing prices.
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Following the existing work of Ronn and Verma (1986) , Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) , and Ericsson and Reneby (2005) , we estimate the asset risk, σ VR V , using the VR method, where the instantaneous relationship between equity volatility and asset volatility is obtained by Itô's lemma.
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Recent theoretical work points out that the VR method has several weaknesses. Duan (1994) emphasizes that the equity volatility is assumed to be constant in the instantaneous relationship. Yet, the equity volatility is a function of the asset value, V N , and time t N , which is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion process. Another disadvantage of the VR method is that if a firm has a high default probability (i.e. the firm value is close to the face value of debt), σ VR V becomes very sensitive to small changes in leverage. Furthermore, when the estimation period overlap two financial calender years, the leverage is likely to change causing σ VR V to be biased.
18 Despite the obvious disadvantages we include σ VR V in our empirical analysis and compare σ VR V with asset variance estimates applying the iterative procedure of Moody's KMV.
In the credit risk literature, the Moody's KMV method, described by Crosbie and Bohn (2003), has become a popular algorithm for estimating the unobserved σ V based on a time series of asset values. Compared to the VR method, Lando (2004) finds that this approach is more robust to changes in the leverage. Duan et al. (2004) show that the KMV method is numerically efficient under the Merton (1974) model. By using a large sample of U.S. firms, Vassalou and Xing (2004) apply a similar approach to compute the firms' default probabilities.
Following the implementation of the KMV method by Vassalou and Xing (2004) , we estimate the asset volatility, σ KMV V , before and after the OBC grants, where the iterative scheme converges only after a handful of iterations.
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16 When firms have dual class shares, the market value of equity is defined as the sum of the market value of class A-and class B-shares. 17 Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) study the association between OBC and managerial investment decisions, and they use the VR method to test for risk-shifting in the asset variance. Marcus and Shaked (1984) and Ronn and Verma (1986) apply the VR method to find the level of deposit insurance premiums in the U.S. banking market and Ericsson and Reneby (2005) examine different estimation techniques such as the VR method, when implementing structural bond pricing models. A more detailed derivation is found in Appendix B. 18 Assuming that the debt level falls (increases) over the estimation period, the leverage in the instantaneous relation is assumed to be too low (high) at time t N and does not represent the actual leverage in the entire estimation period. This causes E obs N /V N to be upward (downward) biased which eventually leads to a higher
One disadvantage of the iterative algorithm is that it does not provide standard errors of σ KMV V and thereby does not allow for statistical inference. However, Duan et al. (2004) find that σ KMV V in a Merton (1974) framework is identical to the transformed-data maximum likelihood estimates of the asset volatility developed
Measurement and summary of key variables
We follow the approach in Skinner (1989) and define a variance ratio σ 2 t+1 / σ 2 t , where σ 2 t+1 and σ 2 t are the estimated variances over a period of 250 days after and 125 days before the option grant date, respectively. Consistent with DeFusco et al. (1990) and Brookfield and Ormrod (2000) we form a market-adjusted variance ratio to filter out market-wide factors where the variances are divided by the variance of the market index before forming the variance ratios.
20 The market-adjusted risk-shifting measure could easily be criticized for not adjusting for industry effects. Our data do, however, not allow for such an adjustment since the Danish stock market is characterized by relatively few stocks in each industry peer with low liquidity. This makes an industry-adjusted measure less reliable and we therefore leave the use of the industry-adjustment method open for future exploration on larger stock markets.
As examined by DeFusco et al. (1990) and Brookfield and Ormrod (2000), we investigate whether OBC grants increase the underlying stock return volatility (i.e. we examine whether the variance ratios are larger than one) and let SVR and MSVR denote the stock return variance ratio and the marketadjusted stock return variance ratio, respectively.
To better understand how the manager changes the stock risk we extend the analysis by examining whether OBC encourages the manager to change the asset risk. When estimating the asset variance, we implement both the VR and KMV method and form variance ratios, where AVR denotes the asset variance ratio and MAVR denotes the market-adjusted asset variance ratio.
Before jumping to the conclusion that the managers change the stock risk by changing the asset risk, we need to control for Changes-in-leverage, where leverage is defined as market value of total debt to market value of equity.
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In the regression analysis we follow the existing literature and use M arketto-book and F irm size as control variables, where M arket-to-book is the ratio between market and book value of total assets and F irm size is the natural by Duan (1994) . A more detailed description of our implementation of the KMV method is provided in Appendix B. 20 The all-share index (KAX) on CSE is used for the estimation of the market variance. A full description of the main indices on Copenhagen Stock Exchange (CSE) is found via the home page, www.cse.dk. 21 Note that the leverage depends on the market value of total debt. Hence, leverage depends on the estimation method used to compute the asset variance. Later we emphasize that similar empirical results are obtained when using alternative leverage specifications. logarithm of total assets.
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[Insert Table 3]   Table 3 provides summary statistics for the key variables. The changes in the stock risk in our study are similar to related studies, such as DeFusco et al. (1990) and Brookfield and Ormrod (2000) . We find that the median SVR and MSVR is 1.028 and 1.128, respectively. When comparing the asset variance ratios using either the VR or the KMV method, we immediately notice that the two methods provide very different mean and median ratios. As mentioned above, our focus will be on the more efficient KMV method and compare these ratios with the less robust VR method used in earlier studies (see e.g., Ronn and Verma (1986) , and Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) ).
The table also shows that the leverage does not change much for the median firm. The minimum and maximum Changes-in-leverage KMV are, however, 0.004 and 25.379, respectively, suggesting that some firms in our sample experience large changes in the leverage during the estimation period. Later we investigate whether Changes-in-leverage may have an impact on changes in stock risk. Furthermore, the mean (median) M arket-to-book KMV is 1.685 (1.140), while the mean (median) F irm size is 21.329 (21.311).
[Insert Table 4 ] Table 4 reports the correlations between the key variables. As expected we find that MSVR is positively correlated with both MAVR and Changesin-leverage using both the VR and KMV method. Table 4 also shows a correlation close to one between Changes-in-leverage VR and Changes-inleverage KMV , while the correlation between VR and KMV estimated marketadjusted asset variance ratios is much smaller, suggesting that the asset variance is more sensitive to the estimation method than the market value of total debt.
Empirical results
In this section, we document (1) the impact of option grants on firms' risk shifting, (2) how changes in asset risk and/or leverage cause changes in stock risk, and (3) whether the grant date price-to-strike ratios have an impact on changes in stock risk. Throughout the empirical analysis, we only use the market-adjusted asset variances to investigate for risk-shifting after option grants.
Risk-shifting following option grants
We first test for risk-shifting in stock and asset risk. In addition, we examine whether changes in asset risk or changes in leverage are related to changes in stock risk.
Changes in stock and asset risk
In the following, we test our first hypothesis that option grants encourage managerial risk-taking by examining changes in stock and asset risk. We use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to examine the null hypothesis that the sample median of the variance ratios are identical. In other words, we test whether the variances are the same before and after the option grant date.
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[Insert Table 5 ] Table 5 reports the results from testing for risk-shifting in the variances after the firm issues OBC. In Panel A, we examine risk-shifting after the first option grant. When focusing on changes in stock risk, the results support our predictions that options increase the stock return variance. Consistent with related studies, such as DeFusco et al. (1990) and Brookfield and Ormrod (2000), we find that MSVR is highly significant above one at the 1% level.
As mentioned in the introduction, our primary contribution to the literature is the implementation of estimation methods which allow us to test for risk-shifting in the unobservable asset risk. In Panel A, we find no significant change in the market-adjusted asset risk using the VR method. On the other hand, we find highly significant positive changes in the market-adjusted asset variance when the variances are inferred using the KMV method. Focusing on the results using the KMV method, our results indicate that managers increase stock risk by increasing the asset risk.
In Panel B, we test for risk-shifting after all option grants. Overall, the results are consistent with the results reported in Panel A, indicating that repeated option grants still provide the manager with enough risk-taking incentives to increase the future asset and stock risk. Table 5 also shows very different results when comparing the marketadjusted asset variances MAVR VR to MAVR KMV . This indicates that the choice of estimation method in studies like ours has a considerable impact on the results emphasizing the importance of implementing efficient estimation methods like the KMV method.
Although not reported in tables, we analyze how sensitive the results are to the choice of estimation period following the option grants. Overall, when reducing the post estimation period, less support of risk-shifting is found, suggesting that it takes time for the manager to invest in new and more risky projects. Furthermore, we obtain similar results when testing for risk-shifting using variance ratios not adjusted for market risk.
The impact from changes in leverage and asset risk on changes in stock risk
In the previous section we documented positive and highly significant changes in stock risk as well as in asset risk. We interpreted these results in favor of our first hypothesis that options indeed increase managerial risk-taking through more risky investments. This may, however, not be the entire truth since managers could use leverage as an instrument to increase the underlying stock risk and thereby the value of the option grant. Lewellen (2006) studies the association between compensation and financing decisions and finds that greater risk incentives increase the manager's appetite for higher leverage.
In order to control for the leverage effect on stock risk, we regress the changes in stock risk on changes in asset risk and leverage. Because of limited observations the following analysis are based on the sample containing all option grants.
[Insert Table 6 ] Table 6 reports estimates from regressing changes in stock risk on either changes in asset risk or changes in leverage. Finally, we regress changes in stock risk on both instruments controlled by the manager. In all the regressions we include the market-to-book ratio and firm size to control for growth opportunities and size effects, respectively. Furthermore, we include year dummies and indicator variables for all 2-digit Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industries in our sample to control for year effects and industry fixed effects, respectively. The reported t-statistics are tabulated in parentheses and are based on either Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors or robust standard errors clustered by firm (see e.g., Petersen (2007) ).
Panel A of Table 6 reports the results using the VR method to estimate the asset risk. In Model (1), we regress changes in stock risk on changes in asset risk plus firm specific control variables. The coefficient estimate on changes in asset risk is positive and strongly significant. Considering Model (2), we find that the coefficient on changes in leverage is positive but insignificant. On the other hand, in Model (3) we find that both the coefficients on changes in asset risk and leverage are strongly positive and significant. Furthermore, in Model (4) to (6) we address the econometric problems that may bias our results since we allow firms to have multiple option grants. We follow Petersen (2007) and cluster by firm to account for firm fixed effects and find that our results are qualitatively similar to the regression results reported in Model (1) to (3). Finally, in all six regressions we control for growth opportunities, firm size, year effects, and industry fixed effects.
In Panel B, we apply the KMV method to estimate the asset variance. Consistent with our predictions, we find that both changes in asset risk and leverage are positive and highly significantly associated with stock risk changes. We obtain stronger significance on the MAVR coefficient estimates once we use standard errors clustered by firm while we loose some significance on the changes in leverage coefficient estimates. In all six regressions neither M arketto-book KMV nor F irm size are significantly related to changes in stock risk. In sum, consistent with the existing literature we find that managers increase stock risk by increasing leverage. Furthermore, we contribute to the existing literature by showing that risk incentives from option grants encourage managers not only to increase leverage but also increase the asset risk. Hence, our results suggest that option grants affect both financing and investment decisions.
Further robustness checks
In order to ensure that our results are robust to alternative variable specifications and estimation periods, we check the results in several ways. First, we examine how sensitive the results are to an estimation period of 125 and 200 days following the option grant. In all cases, we find a positive and significant relation between changes in stock risk and asset risk, while the coefficient of Changes-in-leverage KMV is insignificant. We also check for robustness in the results if we include alternative leverage specifications. Following Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) we define leverage as book value of total debt divided by market value of equity. In all cases, the results are similar to the findings reported in Table 6 . In Section 3.1.1 we reported that our unique sample has a high dispersion in grant date price-to-strike ratios, which allows us to empirical investigate recent theoretical predictions that risk-taking incentives vary across moneyness (see e.g., Carpenter (2000), and Brisley (2006)). In order to examine whether the option's moneyness has an impact on future managerial risk-taking we need to define our measure of moneyness. This may seem as a trivial task at first, but in our case most option grants consist of several sub-grants with very different characteristics, such as price-to-strike ratios. We therefore immediately rule out the average price-to-strike ratio across all sub-grants since the option payoff is highly nonlinear. To capture the nonlinearity we define the moneyness per grant as the weighted price-to-strike ratio of all sub-grants with respect to both the option value and risk incentive.
25 The value weighted measure will, by definition, distribute most weight on in-the-money options whereas the incentive weighted measure distributes most weight on options granted out-of-the-money or at-the-money. When analyzing the moneyness' impact on risk-shifting in stock risk, we expect to find a positive relation for options granted out-of-the-money and at-the-money, while we predict decreasing changes in stock risk for in-the-money option grants. We follow Huddart and Lang (1996) and include M oneyness and M oneyness-squared in our regressions to capture the expected concave relation between risk-shifting and the option's moneyness.
[Insert Table 7 ] Table 7 reports estimates from regressing changes in stock risk on M oneyness and M oneyness-squared using either the value or the incentive weighted measure of moneyness. Furthermore, we include changes in asset risk and leverage as we earlier found that managers change stock risk by changing both asset risk and firm leverage. Finally, we control for growth opportunities, size effects, year effects and industry fixed effects in all regression specifications.
Panel A (Panel B) of Table 7 reports the results using value (incentive) weighted moneyness in the regressions. Consistent with our predictions we find in Model (1) and (3) (Model (5) and (7)) the coefficient on M oneyness is positive and highly significant, while the coefficient on M oneyness-squared is negative and highly significant, suggesting that there is a concave association between the grant date price-to-strike ratios and risk-shifting behavior. Furthermore, the concave relation is still significant after controlling for changes in asset risk and leverage. The statistical significance is, however, reduced once we use robust standard errors clustered by firm (CL-Firm).
The significant coefficients on M oneyness and M oneyness-squared reported in Table 7 allow us to illustrate the partial effect on changes in stock risk across moneyness. (5)) is the partial effect using the value (incentive) weighted moneyness, whereas Model (2) (Model (6)) is the partial effects using the value (incentive) weighted moneyness after controlling for changes in asset risk and leverage.
26 Consistent with our predictions we obtain a concave relation between moneyness and risk-shifting in stock risk. We also find that including MAVR KMV and Changes-in-leverage KMV in our regressions do not have any considerable impact on our results, while the relation between moneyness and changes in stock risk becomes more concave when using incentive weighted moneyness instead of value weighted moneyness. In addition, we find that the partial effect starts to drop at a very high level of moneyness, suggesting that managers in our sample are less risk averse and undiversified than we expected. The results seem at first to be inconsistent with related work by Hall and Murphy (2002) and Lewellen (2006) . However, their analysis are based on parameters corresponding to sample medians of U.S. firms, where the option component of the total compensation scheme account for more than three times the size of a median Danish option component in 2002 (see e.g., Bechmann and Jørgensen (2004) , and Jensen and Murphy (2004) ). We therefore would expect different risk-shifting behavior by Danish managers compared to U.S. managers since a smaller option component reduces the downside risk but still maintain a substantial upside potential.
In sum, the unique sample used in this paper allows us to examine riskshifting across moneyness of option grants. Consistent with theoretical predictions we find empirical evidence of a concave relation between moneyness and risk-shifting in stock risk. We think this contributes to the existing literature about optimal compensation structure since our results may help the compensation committee to choose a strike price that causes the intended changes in firm risk.
We check our results in several ways. First, we implement the VR method to estimate the asset risk and perform the same regression analysis as before. In all regression specifications, we obtain highly significant positive and negative coefficients on M oneyness and M oneyness-squared, respectively. In addition, the estimated coefficients have the same magnitude as the coefficients reported in Table 7 . Secondly, we also check for robustness in our results when measuring leverage as book value of total debt divided by market value of equity. Lastly, we analyze whether outliers in our key variables may bias our results. We fix outliers by winsorizing M oneyness and M oneyness-squared at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In all cases, the results are qualitatively similar to the findings reported in Table 7 and are available upon request.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the relation between managerial risk-shifting incentives from OBC and firm risk in a broad sample of firms and industries. In particular, we provide empirical evidence of how changes in asset risk and leverage affect changes in stock risk after option grants.
We carefully derive our hypothesis by analyzing the option risk incentives obtained from the Black and Scholes (1973) model and from an expected utility model. Consistent with the existing literature, we predict that option grants increase managerial risk-taking. In addition, we follow the recent theoretical conjectures and predict that risk-shifting varies across price-to-strike ratios.
In our empirical investigation we use the approach outlined in Skinner (1989) to compute market-adjusted variance ratios and examine whether option grants have a positive impact on firm risk. The empirical results suggest a positive increase in the stock risk after option grants, which is consistent with the findings by DeFusco et al. (1990) and Brookfield and Ormrod (2000) . In addition, we extend the existing literature by analyzing whether the increased stock risk is caused by changes in asset risk and/or leverage, where the unobservable asset risk is estimated using the volatility restriction method and Moody's KMV algorithm in a Merton (1974) framework. The empirical results provide support for the hypothesis that managers increase stock risk by increasing asset risk and leverage. Furthermore, these results remain unchanged after controlling for growth opportunities, firm size, year effects and industry fixed effects.
Our unique sample also provides us with the opportunity to test for riskshifting across grant date price-to-strike ratios. We find empirical evidence of a concave relation between option moneyness and risk-shifting in stock risk, suggesting that out-of-the-money option grants cause the manager to increase risk-taking, while deep-in-the-money option grants reduce managerial risk-taking. These results support recent theoretical predictions that the compensation committee's moneyness policy may have a considerable impact on managerial risk-shifting behavior.
Overall, consistent with previous studies we find that option grants have a positive impact on both stock risk and leverage. In addition, this paper makes two significant contributions to the literature. First, and perhaps foremost, we examine risk-shifting behavior in the unobservable asset risk and find that managers indeed increase stock risk by increasing the risk in future investment decisions. Furthermore, our unique data allows us to empirical investigate riskshifting across grant date moneyness. Consistent with recent theoretical work we show that the option's price-to-strike ratio has a substantial impact on managerial risk-taking behavior.
A Appendix: The certainty-equivalent framework Hall and Murphy (2002) express the expected utility approach as
We will now show how to rewrite the expected utility for one side of the equality only,
where the continuously compounded logreturns are determined by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). We assume that the nondividend paying stock price, P t , is lognormal distributed and follows a geometric Brownian motion process dP t = αP t dt+σP t dW P with an instantaneous drift α, an instantaneous stock volatility σ and a standard Brownian motion W P . It is now straightforward to show that ln (P T /P 0 ) ∼ N ((r + β (r m − r) − σ 2 /2) T, σ 2 T ) . If we standardize ln
we are able to write P T as a function of the standard normal random variable z,
Assuming that P T (z) is a strictly monotonic function with a continuous derivative P T (z), we are able to rewrite equation (A.1) to
We know from the rules of differentiation that (A.4) and this enables us to rewrite our numerical integration term in equation (A.3) as,
If we use the change of variables formula and let z = g(P T ) be a smooth differentiable mapping with a one-to-one relation, hence P T = g −1 (z). Then the probability density function of z can be obtained from the probability density function of P T ,
By using equation (A.6) this enables us to rewrite (A.5) and integrate over a standard normal distribution factor z,
(A.7)
B Appendix: The Merton (1974) model and estimation of asset risk
The Merton (1974) model is given as,
where the value of a firm's assets V is lognormal and follows a geometric Brownian motion process dV = µ V V dt+σ V V dW V with an instantaneous drift µ V , an instantaneous asset volatility σ V , and a standard Brownian motion W V . D is the face value debt with maturity date T , and r is the risk-free interest rate. d
and N (·) is the standard normal distribution function.
The VR method:
The VR method applies the Itô's formula to find the instantaneous relationship between equity volatility and asset volatility,
is the estimated equity volatility using historical daily equity observations, E Ronn and Verma (1986) .
The KMV algorithm:
In a Merton (1974) framework, E obs i = E (V i , t i ; σ V ), the KMV method computes the value of assets at each time point i = 1, ..., N given an initial guess of σ 0 V , which is assumed to be the historical estimated equity volatility. risk-free interest rate is 4%, the equity risk-premium, rm − r, is 3%, the stock return volatility is 20%, and beta is 0.65. The relative risk-aversion is 2 and the non-firm-related manager wealth is $583,440. 
n j is the number of options in sub-grant j, St is the underlying stock price at the grant date, X j is the strike price of the option in sub-grant j with the time to maturity T j . σ is the annualized stock return volatility computed as the standard deviation of the daily logreturns from 125 trading days prior the grant date multiplied by √ 250. The continuous risk-free interest rate, r, is equal to ln(1 + R), where R is the one year Copenhagen Inter-Bank Offered Rates (CIBOR).
Risk incentive of each option is defined by Guay (1999) as the option value sensitivity to a 1% increase in the annualized stock return volatility. The risk incentive for the grant is then given as the sum of the risk incentive of each sub-grant j, variance ratio and the market-adjusted stock return variance ratio, respectively. AVR is the asset variance ratio and MAVR is the market-adjusted asset variance ratio, where the ratios are depicted using both the VR and KMV method. Changes-in-leverage is the market value of total debt to market value of equity and M arket-to-book is the ratio between market and book value of total assets, where the ratios are depicted using both the VR and KMV method. F irm size is natural logarithm of total assets. This table provides the correlations between the key variables. SVR and MSVR denote the stock return variance ratio and the market-adjusted stock return variance ratio, respectively. AVR is the asset variance ratio and MAVR is the market-adjusted asset variance ratio, where the ratios are depicted using both the VR and KMV method. Changes-in-leverage is the market value of total debt to market value of equity and M arket-to-book is the ratio between market and book value of total assets, where the ratios are depicted using both the VR and KMV method. F irm size is natural logarithm of total assets. for asset variances inferred using the VR and KMV method, respectively. MAVR is the market-adjusted asset variance ratio, Changes-in-leverage is the market value of total debt to market value of equity, M arket-to-book is the ratio between market and book value of total assets and F irm size is natural logarithm of total assets. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on either Newey-West (NW) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors or robust standard errors clustered by firm (CL-Firm). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Coefficients on industry and year dummies are not reported.
Mean
Panel A: VR estimated asset risk
Model
(1) for value and incentive weighted price-to-strike ratios, respectively. M oneyness denotes the option's weighted price-to-strike ratio at the grant date and M oneyness-squared is the squared weighted price-to-strike ratio. MAVR is the market-adjusted asset variance ratio, Changes-in-leverage is the market value of total debt to market value of equity, M arket-to-book is the ratio between market and book value of total assets and F irm size is natural logarithm of total assets. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on either Newey-West (NW) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors or robust standard errors clustered by firm (CL-Firm). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Coefficients on industry and year dummies are not reported. 
